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TIPPING THE SCALE TO BRING A BALANCED
APPROACH: EVIDENCE DISCLOSURE IN CHINESE
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
Bryant Yuan Fu Yang† and Diane Chen Dai††
Abstract: Due to the ever-increasing trade between China and the rest of the
world, commercial disputes have risen dramatically. Many foreign companies choose to
resolve these disputes through arbitration to circumvent the Chinese courts and to retain
more autonomy and control. Arbitration itself can also be a problem because rules and
laws differ, depending on the jurisdiction and the institution involved. Under China’s
civil law tradition, arbitrators are restricted in their ability to force parties to disclose
evidence that may be detrimental to their case. Additionally, arbitrators have no
authority to obtain evidence from uncooperative third parties. This Article seeks to
provide some guidance for parties engaged in arbitration proceedings in China.

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2005, China became the world’s fourth largest economy. 1 On
average, China’s economy has grown by 9.4% annually for the past twentyseven years,2 and it is expected to continue to grow by 7.5% until 2010.3
China’s incredible transition to a market economy has lifted 250 million

†
Associate Attorney, Morrison & Foerster LLP; J.D., University of California, Berkeley School of
Law (Boalt Hall); B.A., Ethnic Studies and Legal Studies, University of California Berkeley. I want to
thank everyone at the Chinese International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (“CIETAC”) for
their support and cooperation with this article. I am especially grateful to Chen Min for giving me the
opportunity to extern at CIETAC and Wang Yingmin, Cao Liujin, Chen Bo, Guo Huaning, and Jia Shen for
their friendship and warmth. Also, I want to thank Professor Robert Berring, Jr. Since my sophomore year
in college, you have been there to guide, console, and encourage me from one insane project to another,
from Johannesburg, to Bangkok, to Beijing. A hundred acknowledgements of this type could not begin to
convey my gratitude. Lastly, I want to thank the editors at the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal for
giving me the opportunity to publish this Article and for their tireless efforts at improving the quality of this
piece.
††
Ph.D. Candidate 2008, Civil and Commercial Law, Renmin University; M.A., International
Economic Law, Dailian Maritime University; B.A., International Economic Law, Dailian Maritime
University. I want to thank Wang Yingmin of the China Maritime Arbitration Commission for giving me
the opportunity to conduct the research necessary for this article. I would also like to thank Li Chunli for
providing me with invaluable information.
1
Keith Bradsher, China Reports Another Year of Strong (or Even Better) Growth, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
25, 2006. In 2005, China had an economic output of USD 2.26 trillion. Only the United States, Japan and
Germany have larger economies. Id.
2
Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America, China’s GDP grows
9.5% in first half (July 20, 2005), http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/gyzg/t204319.htm (last visited Dec.
12, 2006) (quoting Zheng Jingping from the National Bureau of Statistics).
3
China’s GDP growth to average 7.5% in 2006-2010, REUTERS, Mar. 20, 2006.
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people out of poverty,4 and much of this progress is the result of the Chinese
government’s decision to open its market and resources to the outside world.
However, as trade, investment, and general business interactions continue to
increase, so do international and domestic commercial conflicts.
To resolve these conflicts, many companies, both domestic and
foreign, opt to use alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) rather than turn to
the Chinese courts. ADR is the preferred method of resolving disputes
because it is consistent with Chinese cultural and historical practice. 5
Traditionally, the Chinese have relied on an informal legal system composed
of dispute resolution devices, using village elders and guild procedures, 6
rather than the country’s formal legal system. 7 This approach reflects
Confucian ideals of social harmony and reconciliation, providing parties
with a “face-saving” device and an opportunity to save business
relationships.8 Many foreign investors and international companies prefer
ADR because it gives them more control and autonomy9 than they would
have in Chinese courts. ADR provides them with an alternative to China’s
legal system, which they perceive as biased against foreigners, opaque in
nature, and lacking political independence.10 In addition to this perception
of unfairness, other factors impede foreign parties from seeking remedial
action, including the use of Mandarin during all court proceedings, the need
for Chinese counsel, and foreigners’ unfamiliarity with China’s domestic
laws. Foreign investors believe arbitration is less biased and more equitable
because it allows them to be a part of the appointment process for selecting
an arbitrator, and because it provides other contractual rights such as the
4
Callum MacLeod, Report Illustrates Huge Gap Between China’s Rich, Poor, USA TODAY, Dec.
16, 2005. It is important to note that there are still millions in China who are extremely poor and growth in
wealth has been imbalanced.
5
See Henry J. Graham, Foreign Investment Laws of China and the United States: A Comparative
Study, 5 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 253, 254-55 (1996).
6
William C. Jones, Trying to Understand the Current Chinese Legal System, in UNDERSTANDING
CHINA’S LEGAL SYSTEM 7, 18 (C. Stephen Hsu ed., 2003).
7
Id. at 16-17. See also THE GREAT QING CODE 9-11 (William C. Jones trans., Claredon Press
1994). The center of the formal system was The Code (dynastic code), which was a directive to the district
magistrate to tell him when to punish and precisely what punishment to inflict in any circumstances that
were perceived to be legally significant. There were no parties or lawyers; the magistrate acted with
immediate and total control. The proceedings tended to be harsh on all participants. Everyone, including
witnesses, was imprisoned and punishment was handed-out without compassion.
8
Graham, supra note 5.
9
George O. White III, Navigating the Cultural Malaise: Foreign Direct Investment Dispute
Resolution in the People’s Republic of China, 5 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 55, 68 (2003).
10
Id. at 71. See also Frederick Brown & Catherine A. Rogers, The Role of Arbitration in Resolving
Transnational Disputes: A Survey of Trends in the People's Republic of China, 15 BERKELEY J. INT'L. L.
329, 333 (1997). But see Teema Ruskola, Legal Orientalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 179 (2002) (discussing, at
length, how perceptions of the Chinese legal system are often based on stereotypes, Western biases, and
ignorance).
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ability to designate English as the official language for the proceedings.11
All of these factors make ADR a more convenient and attractive method of
dispute resolution for foreign investors.12
Although negotiation and mediation are preferred in China, 13
arbitration is used when these forms of dispute resolution fail. 14 Today,
arbitration is the standard method of dispute resolution in China, as well as
the primary method of resolving international commercial disputes.15 There
are over 180 domestic arbitration commissions in mainland China.16 In the
last decade, the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration
Commission (“CIETAC”), China’s foremost international arbitration
institution, has handled more cases than any other international arbitration
center.17
While there are tremendous advantages to international arbitration,18
arbitration itself can present problems. Arbitral procedural and substantive
rules vary, depending on the country and the institution engaged in the
dispute. There is a global movement towards harmonizing arbitration law,
but differences still exist.19 For example, evidence disclosure law differs
markedly depending on whether the place of arbitration, lex loci arbitri,20
lies in a common law or civil law jurisdiction. 21 The term “evidence
disclosure” is used here rather than “discovery,” because procedural rules
11

White, supra note 9, at 68.
Id. at 71.
13
From 1980 to 2000, there were approximately 130 million civilian cases mediated in China, five
times the number of cases handled by the Chinese courts. Kevin C. Clark, The Philosophical
Underpinnings and General Workings of Chinese Mediation Systems: What Lessons Can American
Mediators Learn?, 2 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 117, 127 (2002).
14
White, supra note 9, at 67.
15
Id.
16
Eu Jin Chua, Symposium: Legal Implications of a Rising China: The Laws of the People’s
Republic of China: An Introduction for International Investors, 7 CHI. J. INT'L L. 133, 142 (2006).
17
Tang Houzhi, The Arbitration Road–in Commemoration of the 50th Anniversary of the Founding
of CCPIT, in 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FOUNDING OF THE CHINESE COUNCIL FOR THE PROMOTION OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE (2002).
18
Alan Redfern & Martin Hunter, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 22-23 (4th ed. 2004).
19
Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Symposium: International Commercial Arbitration: Globalization of
Arbitral Procedure, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1313, 1321 (2003) (“Arbitration laws are increasingly
harmonized. As a result, they tend to become interchangeable. Admittedly, most of them have not yet
reached this stage, but the overall trend is undisputable.”).
20
See Christopher S. Gibson, Report: Awards and Other Decisions: Articles 59 to 66, 9 AM. REV.
INT'L ARB. 181, 185 (1998).
21
Although most states accommodate parties’ autonomy, the state may wish to preserve the
“integrity of its legal order or protect the rights of non-parties.” For this reason, “the lex arbitri governs all
phases of arbitration . . . [P]ublic policy consideration impose mandatory requirements upon the arbitral
tribunal and define the available judicial remedies for assisting or controlling the arbitral process.” Saul
Perloff, The Ties that Bind: The Limits of Autonomy and Uniformity in International Commercial
Arbitration, 13 U. PA. J. INT’L. BUS. L. 323, 329-30 (1992).
12
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and practices related to evidence disclosure vary to a significant extent in
international arbitration.22
International arbitration must balance the concepts of fairness and
efficiency.23 Arbitration is designed to provide a quick, efficient process of
resolving disputes, and to serve as an alternative to drawn-out and costly
litigation.24 Because of arbitration’s concise nature, unconstrained evidence
disclosure powers cannot be granted to arbitrators. 25 Without adequate
mechanisms for compelling disclosure, however, arbitrators may not gather
all the relevant information needed to render a fair decision.26 This fear is
especially well-founded when disputes involve parties with unequal powers
and resources.
This Article examines whether Chinese international arbitration
achieves this balance and concludes that it does not in its current form.
Additional steps must be taken to provide Chinese arbitrators with the
discretion and authority needed to compel evidence disclosure and to ensure
substantial justice in the arbitration process. This Article also provides
guidance for foreign investors and companies that seek to compel disclosure
from an uncooperative opposing party or nonparty.
This Article compares three aspects of evidence disclosure practice:
party disclosure, nonparty disclosure, and pre-hearing disclosure of
evidence. 27 As a civil law jurisdiction, China’s legal system stands in
contrast to the United States and other common law jurisdictions in regard to
its evidentiary disclosure law. Whereas in most common law jurisdictions
these mechanisms are viable and liberally granted, it is difficult to compel
evidence disclosure in Chinese arbitration. In some situations, it is not even
possible.
22

Redfern & Hunter, supra note 18, at 299 (“Indeed, it is better to avoid the use of the term
‘discover’ because it is an ambiguous term. To a civil lawyer, it means nothing; to a U.S. lawyer it
encompasses production of documents and depositions of potential witness and experts as well as
inspection of the subject-matter of the dispute; to an English lawyer it refers only to the production of
documents.”).
23
Eric A. Schwartz, Reconciling Speed with Justice in International Arbitration, in IMPROVING
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: THE NEED FOR SPEED AND TRUST 44, 44 (Benjamin G. Davis ed., 1998).
24
See John C. Koski, From Hide-And-Seek to Show-And-Tell: Evidentiary Disclosure Rules, 17 AM.
J. TRIAL ADVOC. 497, 497 (1993) (stating that discovery increases the duration and cost of litigation).
25
Redfern & Hunter, supra note 18, at 300 (“Wholesale disclosure of documents is an expensive and
time-consuming process for all concerned and rarely reveals the ‘smoking gun’ that is being sought.”).
26
See Gabriel Herrmann, Note, Discovering Policy Under The Federal Arbitration Act, 88 CORNELL
L. REV. 779, 802-03 (2003).
27
This Article limits itself to these three areas for organizational and clarity purposes. There is an
array of topics that could be discussed on the issue of evidence disclosure in international arbitration, such
as on-site evidence collection or expert testimony. However, this Article was written as an in-depth
analysis of a few issues, rather than a broad scan of the topic.
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Part I describes CIETAC, its institutional rules, and the Chinese
Arbitration Law to provide background to international arbitration in China.
Part II compares CIETAC arbitrators’ lack of authority to compel disclosure
from parties with the authority of other international arbitration institutions,
and suggests potential avenues for recourse. Part III highlights the lack of
power arbitrators have over nonparties in China, while simultaneously
showing that CIETAC can exert some influence over nonparties to
encourage disclosure. Part IV explores pre-hearing evidence disclosure
proceedings. Part V concludes by providing several steps that parties can
take to achieve their preferred levels of evidentiary disclosure during their
arbitrations in China.
II.

BACKGROUND: CIETAC AND THE CHINESE ARBITRATION LAW

International arbitration is a “hybrid” of private and public law 28
because “[i]t begins as a private agreement between the parties . . . [y]et it
ends with an award that has binding legal force.”29 Any arbitration thus has
two distinct legal orders or systems. One is imposed by the contract
between the parties, and the other is set by an external order.30 Because
arbitration is governed both by a private agreement between the parties and
national law, it is crucial to look at two sets of authority when examining
issues in international arbitration: institutional rules and national laws
pertaining to arbitration. Institutional rules are more important in China than
in other jurisdictions because China permits only institutional arbitration; ad
hoc arbitration does not exist. 31 In addition, the process of evidence
collection is usually administered according to the rules of the governing
institute, which is designated by the parties through their contractual
agreement to arbitrate.32
International arbitration in China cannot be discussed without some
background information on CIETAC. In 1956, CIETAC was created “to
28

Redfern & Hunter, supra note 18, at 11.
Id.
30
Perloff, supra note 21, at 327.
31
Eu Jin Chua, supra note 16, at 141. Chinese law does not make any reference to ad hoc
arbitration. However, under Chinese law, if an arbitration agreement does not specify an arbitration
commission, it is void. International arbitration can be both ad hoc and institutional. In an ad hoc
arbitration, the arbitrator or tribunal selected by the parties is responsible for all administrative matters
associated with the arbitration process, such as setting the procedural rules, collecting the fees, and
arranging the hearing. In institutional arbitration, an entity provides these services. Zhao Xiuwen & Lisa
A. Kloppenberg, Reforming Chinese Arbitration Law and Practices in the Global Economy, 31 DAYTON L.
REV. 421, 435 (2006).
32
W. Scott Simpson & Omer Kesikli, The Contours of Arbitration Discovery, 67 ALA. LAW. 280,
283 (2006).
29
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resolve foreign trade disputes relating to ‘contracts, agreements, and/or other
documents between disputing parties.’” 33 In fact, CIETAC was the only
organization authorized to resolve commercial disputes between Chinese
and foreign parties prior to 1996. 34 Because other domestic arbitration
commissions have been established to hear domestic disputes,35 and many
other local institutions are gaining recognition as suitable places to
adjudicate international commercial disputes, CIETAC is no longer the only
forum for resolution through arbitration.36 Nonetheless, CIETAC remains
the main Chinese international arbitration commission. 37 CIETAC’s
headquarters are in Beijing, and its sub-commissions are in Shanghai and
Shenzhen, along with nineteen other liaison offices around the nation.38 In
2005, it took 979 cases, of which it settled 958, 39 earning CIETAC the
distinction of having the highest caseload of any arbitration institution in the
world.40
Although CIETAC has gained an international reputation for fairness
and impartiality,41 and its awards have been enforced in over 140 countries
and regions,42 it is also criticized for its lack of transparency, perceived bias
against foreign parties, and overly expensive and time-consuming process.43
In response to these criticisms, CIETAC amended its arbitration rules in
2005, addressing such pertinent issues as the arbitrator selection process and
the efficiency of the tribunal.44
33
Ge Liu & Alexander Lourie, International Commercial Arbitration in China: History, New
Developments, and Current Practice, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 539, 540 (1995).
34
Eu Jin Chua, supra note 16, at 142. See also White, supra note 9, at 68.
35
Eu Jin Chua, supra note 16, at 142.
36
Id. at 142-43.
37
Id. at 143.
38
China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission, http://www.cietac.org.cn/
english/introduction/intro_1.htm (last visited Dec. 14, 2006).
39
CHINA INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND TRADE ARBITRATION COMMISSION, 50TH ANNIVERSARY
OF CHINA INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND TRADE ARBITRATION COMMISSION 173 (2006).
40
Darren Fitzgerald, CIETAC's New Arbitration Rules: Do the Reforms Go Far Enough?, ASIAN
DISP. REV., July 2005, at 51.
41
Walter J. Duffy Jr. & Roger Hopkins, Peeking over the Great Wall, LEGAL UPDATES, May 2004,
at 5; Zhao Xiuwen & Kloppenberg, supra note 31, at 450 (stating that Chinese arbitration law and practices
are generally in agreement with international arbitration practices).
42
Zhao Xiuwen & Kloppenberg, supra note 31, at 426.
43
See Jerome A. Cohen, Time to Fix China’s Arbitration, FAR E. ECON. REV., Jan. 2005, at 31;
William Heye, Forum Selection for International Dispute Resolution in China–Chinese Courts vs.
CIETAC, 27 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 535, 553 (2004). But see Benjamin O. Kostrzewa,
Comment, China International Economic Trade Arbitration in 2006: New Rules, Same Results?, 15 PAC.
RIM L. & POL’Y 519, 530-31 (2006) (citing an American Chamber of Commerce survey of American
companies that found CIETAC and arbitration in China to be fair and efficient, and that companies who
had no arbitration experience in China have a negative view of arbitration in China).
44
Kostrzewa, supra note 43, at 520.
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The CIETAC International Arbitration Rules of 2005 (“CIETAC 2005
Rules”) provide only half of the procedural framework for evidence
disclosure. The other half is provided by the Arbitration Law of the People’s
Republic of China (“CAL”), which is the primary law regulating arbitration
in China.45 CAL was adopted and promulgated in 1994.46 It was influenced
by international arbitration legislation and practices outside of China,
especially the New York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards and the Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration. 47 In eighty separate articles, CAL prescribes the mandatory
provisions that CIETAC, and all other arbitration institutions, must follow.48
CAL, as the lex loci arbitri, generally governs all phases of international
arbitration in China. CIETAC rules may provide more specific standards as
long as they do not conflict with CAL.49
III.

COMPELLING PARTIES TO DISCLOSE EVIDENCE

A.

Arbitrators Cannot Compel Parties to Disclose Evidence

Unfortunately for parties seeking to obtain evidence from an opposing
party in the course of arbitration, international arbitrators in China lack the
authority to compel unwilling parties to make such disclosures. Unlike the
disclosure provisions contained in other institutional rules, the CIETAC
2005 Rules do not explicitly grant arbitrators the right to compel a party to
disclose evidence. Only CIETAC Articles 37 and 38 provide a framework
that arbitrators can use to deal with situations in which one party wants the
other to produce evidence. Article 38 has stronger language than Article 37,
granting arbitrators the power to “request” the delivery of “relevant
materials, documents, or property and goods for checking, inspection and/or

45

Zhao Xiuwen & Kloppenberg, supra note 31, at 427.
Arbitration Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 31, 1994,
effective Sept. 1, 1995) translated in China Int’l Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission Website,
http://www.cietac.org.cn/english/laws/laws_5.htm (last visited Dec. 13, 2006) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter CAL].
47
Zhao Xiuwen & Kloppenberg, supra note 31, at 428.
48
See CAL supra note 46. Article 79 of CAL provides that “[t]he arbitration organization set up in
cities where the people’s governments of the municipalities, provinces and autonomous regions are located
and other cities which have districts shall be reorganized according to the relevant provisions of this law.
Those not reorganized shall be terminated in one year’s time starting from the date of the implementation
of this law. Other arbitration organizations set up before the implementation of this law and are not in
conformity to the provisions of this law shall be terminated starting from the date of the implementation of
this law.” CAL, supra note 46, art. 79.
49
Perloff, supra note 21, at 329-30.
46
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appraisal” to a tribunal-appointed expert. 50 The article states that “the
parties shall be obliged to comply.”51 Article 37 of the CIETAC 2005 Rules
permits an arbitrator to “undertake investigations and collect evidence as it
considers necessary” on its own initiative.52
Article 38 deals with expert witnesses and thus falls outside the scope
of this piece. Although Article 38 requires parties to comply with an
investigation conducted by an expert, it does not provide sanctioning
powers. Further, the CIETAC 2005 Rules do not allow arbitrators to use
Chinese courts to help gather evidence or to sanction parties for not
complying with orders by the arbitrator. Despite the strong wording in
Article 38, it still does not grant parties or arbitrators any real power to
compel evidence disclosure.
In contrast to Article 38, Article 37 is worded more broadly. The
article can be interpreted as giving arbitrators the authority to “investigat[e]
and collect evidence” in a party’s possession. However, the lack of explicit
language more likely denies arbitrators the authority to compel parties to
disclose evidence.53 First, Article 37 is not often used to obtain evidence in
arbitral proceedings; rather, arbitrators depend heavily on the evidence
submitted by the parties.54 Second, when a party actually petitions for the
use of the article in order to compel the production of evidence,55 arbitrators
use the article’s authority to conduct independent investigations, including
site visits and interviews of witnesses and employees, and to hire experts,
but not to force parties to disclose information or documents.56 Thus, no
article exists in the CIETAC 2005 Rules that can be used to compel a party
to disclose evidence that may be detrimental to its case.
50
CIETAC International Arbitration Rules of 2005, art. 38 (Adopted by the China Council for the
Promotion of International Trade and the China Chamber of International Commerce on Jan. 11, 2005,
effective May 1, 2005) [hereinafter CIETAC 2005 Rules].
51
Id.
52
Id. art. 37.
53
Duffy & Hopkins, supra note 41 (stating that “[d]iscovery basically does not exist. You are
largely limited to supplying documentary evidence to support your own claim and to refute the
complaint.”).
54
Interview with Guo Huaning, CIETAC Secretariat, Beijing China (Nov. 10, 2006) (on file with
Journal) [hereinafter Guo Interview]. She stated: “Usually, the parties are responsible for their cases. If
they say party B has that evidence, then they will try to find other supporting evidence. . . . Normally,
arbitrators check evidence submitted by the parties and [do] not use [A]rticle 37.” However, one arbitrator
did believe that “arbitrators use this rule frequently.” Email Interview with Helen Shi, CIETAC Arbitrator
(Nov. 26, 2006) (on file with Journal) [hereinafter Shi Interview].
55
Interview with Wang Yingmin, CIETAC Secretariat, Beijing China (Nov. 9, 2006) (on file with
Journal) [hereinafter Wang Interview]. He said: “In my experience, the tribunal rarely take[s] up
investigation. Normally one party applies or asks the tribunal to investigate. They censor or check the
evidence and then decide whether to investigate.”
56
Interview with Jia Shen, CIETAC Secretariat, Beijing, China (Nov. 28, 2006) (on file with
Journal) [hereinafter Jia Interview].
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Further, CAL is almost identical to the CIETAC 2005 Rules regarding
evidence collection and disclosure. Article 43 of CAL, like Article 37 of the
CIETAC 2005 Rules, states that “[a]n arbitration tribunal may collect on its
own evidence it considers necessary.”57 None of the other CAL provisions
provide arbitrators with sanctioning powers or the ability to turn to the
Chinese courts if a party refuses to disclose the evidence in its possession.
A recent case illustrates some of the drawbacks created by arbitrators’
lack of power to compel disclosure of evidence. The case involved the sale
of two complex machine presses by an American company to a Chinese
company. 58 The buyer brought the dispute into arbitration, accusing the
seller of delivering non-conforming goods.59 The claimant hoped to regain
all payments previously made and to return the machines.60 However, in the
course of arbitration, the seller discovered that the buyer had been using one
of the machines without any complications. 61 If the arbitrators had the
power to compel the buyer to testify or produce documents that could verify
they were using one of the machines, the respondent could have been able to
obtain a dismissal for half of the claims against it.62 The lack of power to
compel evidence disclosure forced the seller to rely solely on its own records
and testimony that the machines were conforming, forcing the arbitral
tribunal to determine its award based on their perception of the parties’
trustworthiness.
Because there are no express provisions that deal with compelling
evidence disclosure in either the CIETAC 2005 Rules or in CAL, arbitrators
and parties are effectively deprived of the ability to compel evidence
disclosure from a non-consenting party. Articles 37 and 38 of the 2005
CIETAC Rules and Article 43 of CAL are the only pertinent provisions
related to obtaining evidence from a reluctant party. None of these
provisions grant arbitrators explicit sanctioning powers to penalize parties
for refusing to disclose evidence. This leaves parties with little or no
recourse when a party refuses to disclose important evidence.

57

CAL, supra note 46, art. 43.
CIETAC Arbitration Case, Beijing, China (Oct. 19, 2006). Out of confidentiality, the parties’
names, along with any form of information that could be used to identify the parties, have been withheld.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
58
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B.

Civil Law Systems Generally Lack Mechanisms for Compelling
Evidence Disclosure

Arbitrators in other civil law jurisdictions also lack the authority to
compel evidence disclosure. In Germany, for example, there is a legal
framework for forced evidence disclosure. While the Arbitration Rules of
the German Arbitration Institute (“DIS Rules”) permit arbitrators to “order
the production of documents,” 63 the German Arbitration Law 64 is nearly
silent on the powers of arbitrators to collect evidence. It stipulates only that
“failing an agreement by the parties, and in the absence of provisions in this
[law], the arbitral tribunal shall conduct the arbitration in such manner as it
considers appropriate . . . to determine the admissibility of evidence, admit
evidence and freely access such evidence.”65 The German Arbitration Law
does, however, allow the tribunal to request court assistance in taking
evidence and performing other judicial acts which the arbitrator is not
empowered to carry out.66 The arbitrators are “entitled to participate in any
judicial taking of evidence and to ask questions.” 67 Thus, German
arbitrators can indirectly use the German Code on Civil Procedure, which
permits courts to order the production of adverse evidence.
While some authority is granted to German arbitrators to compel
evidence disclosure, that authority is severely restricted. Arbitrators do not
have any explicit authority to compel parties to take testimonies under
oath.68 In addition, parties can only be compelled to produce documents that
were previously referred to by one of the parties.69 Because past practices of
the German courts indicate they did not historically compel evidence

63

German Arbitration Institute Arbitration Rules, art. 27.1 [hereinafter DIS Rules].
Act on the Reform of the Law relating to Arbitral Proceedings, Dec. 22, 1997, BGBl. I at 3224,
available at www.sccinstitute.com/_upload/shared_files/lagar/tyska_lagen_om_skiljedom_eng.pdf (F.R.G.)
[hereinafter GAL].
65
Id. § 1042(4).
66
Id. § 1050.
67
Id.
68
No provision exists in either the GAL or DIS Rules. See GAL, supra note 64; DIS Rules, supra
note 63.
69
Franz Schwarz & Johannes Keopp, Germany, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 2006: A
PRACTICAL INSIGHT TO CROSS-BORDER INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION WORK 185 (Global Legal Group
2006); Stefan Rützel, et al., Germany, in GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH–DISPUTE RESOLUTION 2006 (Gleiss
Lutz 2006), www.gleisslutz.com/media.php/Veröffentlichungen/Downloads/Dispute%20Resolution%20
Germany_2006.pdf?dl=1 (last visited Dec. 7, 2007) (noting “[a]s regards objects to be inspected or
documents to be presented, there are no general disclosure obligations of the parties to the proceedings, or
of third parties. Therefore, documentary evidence usually relates to documents submitted by one of the
parties. If a document referred to is in the other party’s possession, however, such party may be ordered by
the court to produce it.”).
64
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disclosure, German arbitrators may also be reluctant to use all of the
methods permitted for evidence collection.70
France, another civil law jurisdiction, also limits arbitrators’ ability to
collect evidence from the parties. French arbitration laws and institutional
rules are written in broad terms like the CIETAC 2005 Rules and CAL. The
International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Rules (“ICC Rules”) state
that, “[a]t any time during the proceedings, the Arbitral Tribunal may
summon any party to provide additional evidence.”71 Similarly, the French
Arbitration Law in the Nouveau Code de Procedure Civile (New Code of
Civil Procedure) (“N.C.P.C.”) permits arbitrators to “enjoin” a party to
produce an item of evidence. 72 However, neither the ICC Rules nor the
N.C.P.C. allows arbitrators to compel parties to produce evidence, and
arbitrators do not have a way to sanction parties who do not comply with
their decisions or requests. 73 Furthermore, because of the lack of any
permissive language granting arbitrators the authority to compel evidence
disclosure in the N.C.P.C., the tribunal cannot petition French courts to help
collect evidence from uncooperative parties.74
In Germany and France, both the institutional rules and the
jurisdictional law on international arbitration are similar to those in China.
French international arbitrators do not have the power to impose sanctions
against parties who refuse to disclose evidence mandated by the arbitral
tribunal, and parties seeking disclosure may not turn to the French courts for
help. Although parties in Germany may seek help from German courts
outside of the arbitration process, this practice is severely restricted and
rarely used. These jurisdictions reflect the civil law tradition of refusing to
require “discovery” or a wide range of evidence disclosure.

70

Schwarz & Keopp, supra note 69.
International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Rules, Art. 20(5) [hereinafter ICC Rules].
72
Nouveau Code de Procedure Civile [N.C.P.C.], art. 1460(3) (Fr.).
73
Perloff, supra note 21, at 349. Although correct in its assessment that production cannot be
compelled, Perloff is incorrect in interpreting that N.C.P.C. Article 11(2) is applicable to arbitration. Id.
N.C.P.C. Article 11(2) states: “[w]here a party holds evidence material, the judge may, upon the petition of
the other party, order him to produce it, where necessary under a periodic penalty payment. He may, upon
the petition by one of the parties, request or order, where necessary under the same penalty, the production
of all documents held by third parties where there is no legitimate impediment to doing so.” Id. art. 11(2).
The N.C.P.C. expressly states that only Article 11(1) is applicable to arbitration; that article only states that
parties are “held to cooperate” with investigation measures. There is no sanctioning mechanism. Id. art.
11(1).
74
See N.C.P.C. arts. 1442-507.
71

52

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 17 NO. 1

C.

Disclosure Rules in Common Law Jurisdictions Provide a Sharp
Contrast to Rules in Civil Law Jurisdictions

Compared to the civil law system, common law jurisdictions generally
permit arbitral tribunals to order a party to produce evidence. In England,
both institutional rules and arbitration laws grant wide powers to arbitrators
to collect evidence from parties. Arbitrators can compel parties to produce
documents and to testify under oath. The London Center for International
Arbitration (“LCIA”) grants arbitrators the power to force a party to disclose
information. Under Article 22.1 of the LCIA Arbitration Rules, arbitrators
can order any party to make “any property, site or thing under its control and
relating to . . . the arbitration available for inspection by the Arbitral
Tribunal.”75 The LCIA Arbitration Rules also empower arbitrators “to order
any party to produce to the Arbitral Tribunal, and to the other parties for
inspection . . . any documents or classes of documents in their possession.”76
Similarly, the English Arbitration Act permits arbitrators to direct a party to
testify under oath and to make any property relating to the arbitration
available for inspection, photographing, preservation, custody, or
detention.77 Additionally, under the English Arbitration Act, arbitrators may
order parties to disclose documents.78
Like England, Singapore grants wide powers to arbitrators to collect
evidence from parties through its institutional rules and arbitrational laws.
The Arbitration Rules of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre
(“SIAC Rules”) expressly allow arbitrators to “order any party to produce to
the Tribunal, and to the other parties for inspection . . . any documents or
class of documents in their possession or power which the Tribunal
determines to be relevant.”79 In addition to granting many other powers,80
the SIAC Rules also permit arbitrators to “make orders or give directions to
any party for interrogatories.” 81 Like the SIAC Rules, the Singapore
Arbitration Act grants arbitrators the power to order parties to produce

75

London Centre for International Arbitration Rules, art. 22.1(d) [hereinafter LCIA Rules].
Id. art. 22.1(e).
77
Arbitration Act, 1996, arts. 38(4)(a), 38(5) (Eng.).
78
Id. art. 34(2)(d).
79
Singapore International Arbitration Center Rules, art. 24(h) [hereinafter SIAC Rules].
80
Id. arts. 24(c)-(k). Other powers bestowed on arbitrators by the SIAC Rules are permitting parties
to amend pleading or submissions, extending time limits, ordering any property or item for inspection,
preserving, storing, selling, or disposing of any property related to the dispute, directing parties to give
evidence by affidavit, etc.
81
Id. art. 24(i).
76
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documents, answer interrogatories, give evidence by affidavit, and testify
under oath.82
Similarly, the American Arbitration Association Rules (“AAA Rules”)
give arbitrators broad powers to collect evidence. 83 The AAA Rules
expressly permit arbitrators to compel parties to produce “other documents,
exhibits, or other evidence it deems necessary or appropriate” at any time
during the arbitral proceedings.84 Chiarella v. Viscount Industries Co., Ltd.85
illustrates the expansive powers of arbitrators under the AAA Rules. In
Chiarella, the district court rejected a plea to vacate the award by the
plaintiff, who argued that the arbitrator had exceeded its authority by
ordering full discovery, an in camera inspection of allegedly privileged
documents, and an explanation, document-by-document, of the basis of the
claimed privilege. 86 The court held that the AAA Rules “confer on
arbitrators broad powers to ensure that evidence is presented at arbitration
hearings in such a manner as to ensure that legal and factual issues are
sufficiently developed.” 87 The court rejected the plaintiff’s plea on the
grounds that the plaintiff had failed to show that such authority was not
within the arbitrator’s powers.88
In addition to the AAA Rules, Section 7 of the Federal Arbitration Act
(“FAA”) authorizes arbitrators to compel parties to disclose evidence.
Under Section 7, arbitral tribunals in the United States “may summon in
writing any person to attend before them or any of them as a witness and in a
proper case to bring with him or them any book, record, document, or paper
which may be deemed material as evidence in the case.”89 The courts have
interpreted “any person” to include parties involved in the arbitration, as
well as nonparties.90 Parties can be held in contempt of court if they do not
abide by the arbitral tribunal’s order to disclose evidence.91

82

Singapore Arbitration Act, arts. 28(2)(a)-(g) (2001).
Paul D. Friedland & Lucy Martinez , Arbitral Subpoenas under U.S. Law and Practice, 14 AM.
REV. INT'L ARB. 197, 201 (2003). Although the article’s analysis is on Article 31(d) of the Commercial
Arbitration and Mediation Center for the Americas Arbitration Rules, its analysis is important nonetheless
because the language and scope of the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) Rules on international
arbitration are similar to Article 31(d).
84
International Dispute Resolution Procedures (Including Mediation and Arbitration), art. 19(3)
(amended and effective Sept. 1, 2007).
85
No. 92 Civ. 9310 (RPP), 1993 WL 497967 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 1993).
86
Id. at *1-2.
87
Id. at *4.
88
Id.
89
9 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
90
Friedland & Martinez, supra note 83, at 202.
91
9 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
83
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England, Singapore, and the United States provide examples of
common law jurisdictions that permit forced evidence disclosure. In all
three jurisdictions, express rules and regulations grant arbitrators the broad
power to compel parties to disclose evidence, to testify under oath, and to
answer interrogatories.
D.

Alternative Methods Are Available to Arbitrators and Parties to
Compel Evidence Disclosure

Neither CAL nor the CIETAC 2005 Rules grant arbitrators or parties
any authority to compel evidence disclosure. However, there are ways to
circumvent these obstacles. Arbitrators may draw an adverse inference from
a party’s decision to not cooperate with the arbitral tribunal’s request to
disclose evidence. A party thus risks losing credibility and weakening its
case by its refusal to comply with a disclosure request. A party may also ask
a Chinese court to preserve evidence in the hands of an opposing party. The
court will then take possession of the evidence, which is made available to
the arbitrators for examination.
1.

Arbitrators May Draw an Adverse Inference from a Party’s Refusal to
Comply with a Disclosure Request

Despite the apparent lack of options, arbitrators and parties can utilize
a few alternative practices to compel evidence disclosure in Chinese
international arbitration proceedings. The most convenient and pragmatic
step is for arbitrators to “draw an adverse inference” from a party’s inability
or unwillingness to produce the evidence. 92 Professor Martin Hunter, an
experienced arbitrator, defines this process succinctly:
[T]he arbitrator may usually “draw an adverse inference”—
namely, if he believes that the document(s), witness(es) or
information is in existence and could have been supplied, he
will make the assumption that the missing material would be
adverse to the relevant party’s interest.93
CIETAC arbitrators regularly draw adverse inferences when parties hide
damaging evidence, despite being asked by the tribunal to produce it for
inspection.94
92
Email from Martin Hunter, Professor of International Dispute Resolution, Nottingham Law
School, Nottingham Trent University, to authors (Nov. 16, 2006) (on file with Journal) [hereinafter Hunter
Email].
93
Id.
94
Guo Interview, supra note 54; Jia Interview, supra note 56.
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A party’s refusal to disclose evidence without justification can also
influence the outcome of the award. 95 Kou Liyun, a CIETAC arbitrator,
stated, “[i]t really happens in practice and . . . it will put the said party at a
serious disadvantage, i.e. the final award may be in favor of the other
party.”96 Arbitration scholars criticize the adverse inference alternative as
inefficient and too lenient.97 Nonetheless, arbitrators are authorized to draw
adverse inferences, so parties have an incentive to comply with disclosure
requests. 98 The party will have “to determine which is worse—the
production of documents injurious to its case or the inferences that the
arbitrators may draw.”99 Thus, parties in Chinese arbitration may rely on the
arbitrators’ ability to draw adverse inferences to encourage compliance.
Chinese arbitrators may not be able to compel evidence disclosure through
sanctions, but this alternative puts substantial pressure on the non-consenting
party to cooperate.
2.

Evidence Preservation May Be Used to Compel Evidence Disclosure

Parties can also force their opponents to disclose through the process
of “evidence preservation,” which is permitted under Article 18 of the
CIETAC 2005 Rules and Article 68 of the CAL. Article 18 states that when
a party applies for the preservation of evidence, CIETAC will forward the
application “to the competent court at the place where the evidence is
located.”100 Article 68 specifies that in international arbitration proceedings,
the competent court is the Intermediate People’s Court where the evidence is
located.101 A party can apply for evidence preservation whenever it fears
that “the evidence might be destroyed or if it would be difficult to obtain the
evidence later on.”102 Usually, a party submits an application for evidence
95
Shi Interview, supra note 54; Guo Interview, supra note 54. Guo describes a case in which Party
A successfully convinced the tribunal that Party B had detrimental evidence in its possession. When Party
B refused to turn in the evidence, the arbitrator wrote the award in favor of Party A. Guo Interview, supra
note 54.
96
Email from Kou Liyun, CIETAC Arbitrator, to authors (Nov. 12, 2006) (on file with Journal)
[hereinafter Kou Email].
97
Wendy Ho, Discovery in Commercial Arbitration Proceedings, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 199, 222
(1997).
98
Grant Hanessian, Discovery in International Arbitration, 34 INT’L LAW NEWS 1 (2005), available
at http://www.abanet.org/genpractice/magazine/2005/sep/discoveryintl.html.
99
Id.
100
CIETAC 2005 Rules, supra note 50, art. 18.
101
CAL, supra note 46, art. 68.
102
Id. art. 46. Article 46 prescribes that parties must apply to the Basic-level People’s Court to
preserve evidence in domestic cases. However, it contains language explaining when evidence
preservation should be used. Although Article 68 relates to international arbitration, it does not contain any
provisions other than prescribing parties to apply to the Intermediate People’s Court. CAL makes it clear
that in the absence of provisions in Chapter VII, special provisions on foreign-related arbitration, “other
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protection to the CIETAC Secretariat, who then sends the application to the
local court on behalf of the party, providing the party’s contact
information.103 The process is relatively quick and easy. When court fees
are fully paid, a party may get evidence preserved within one or two days.104
Court fees are calculated based on the amount in dispute.105 The evidence,
however, must be “connected with the case,” and it also must belong to the
opposing party.106
Evidence preservation is not identical to forced disclosure. 107 For
example, the courts cannot force a party to comply with evidence
preservation. For the court to intervene and preserve the evidence, the
requesting party must provide specific details about the location of the
evidence, its importance to the case, and its physical description. 108
Furthermore, if the court cannot locate the evidence because of vague
descriptions, or because it has been concealed, the court will not take any
further investigatory action.109 In contrast, forced disclosure, as practiced in
common law jurisdictions, requires parties to comply with the arbitral
tribunal’s orders. Often requiring only that the evidence be related to the
arbitration, requests for evidence disclosure may be broad in comparison to
the specificity required for evidence preservation.
Despite these differences, parties can theoretically use evidence
preservation to circumvent the lack of compelled disclosure mechanisms
within Chinese international arbitration. Upon receipt of a request to
preserve evidence, court officers retrieve the listed evidence and place it
under court supervision.110 No one can take possession of the evidence once
it is under the court’s supervision, but the tribunal sometimes examines the
evidence.111 Only after the dispute in arbitration is settled will the court
release the evidence to its rightful owner.112 An opposing party can, thus,

relevant provisions” of CAL will apply. The absence of evidence preservation provisions in Article 68
means that Article 46 applies.
103
Guo Interview, supra note 54.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Interview with Cao Liujin, CIETAC Secretariat, Beijing, China (Nov. 26, 2006) (on file with
Journal) [hereinafter Cao Interview].
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Guo Interview, supra note 54.
111
Id.
112
Id. (stating that, although the normal procedure requires the party to inform the courts that the case
has been settled, CIETAC carries the burden of sending notice to the courts to release the preserved
evidence or property).
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petition the courts to “preserve” the evidence from a party in order for the
tribunal to analyze the evidence.
Parties frequently use Article 68 of CAL in arbitration proceedings.
Ms. Guo Huaning, a Secretariat of CIETAC, has witnessed many situations
when the “preservation of evidence” successfully led to reconciliation and
settlement.113 In her experience, claimants commonly submit requests under
Article 68 simultaneously with the arbitration application.114 She describes
it as a “kind of pressure” and gives an example of a case where the court
took account books for preservation and the tribunal was permitted to
inspect the books.115
Preservation of evidence can, therefore, serve as an indirect method of
compelled disclosure in Chinese arbitration, because the evidence is taken
under the auspices of the court and the tribunal is free to inspect and use it in
their consideration of arbitral awards.
IV.

COMPELLING NONPARTIES TO DISCLOSE EVIDENCE

A.

Forced Disclosure of Evidence Held by Nonparties Runs Contrary to
the Chinese Legal Philosophy on Arbitration

Whereas the CIETAC 2005 Rules briefly address the parties’
obligations to cooperate with the arbitration process,116 the CIETAC 2005
Rules and CAL are completely silent on the issue of nonparties. There is
one provision in the CAL that relates to the collection of evidence from third
parties. Article 43 of the CAL states that the parties are responsible for
producing evidence to support their claims and that the tribunal “may collect
on its own evidence it considers necessary.”117 This statutory language does
not grant the arbitrators any power to subpoena nonparties to testify or
produce documents. Furthermore, the CAL only permits the arbitral tribunal
to petition the Chinese court for evidence preservation. 118 It does not
empower arbitrators to ask the courts for assistance in evidence collection.
CIETAC secretariat, Wang Yingmin, has stated “[the] Tribunal cannot do
anything if a third party does not want to disclose.”119
113

Id.
Id.
115
Id.
116
CIETAC 2005 Rules, supra note 50, art. 38(2) (stating that the parties shall be “obliged to
comply” with the tribunal’s power to request that the parties produce evidence to be examined by an expert
or appraiser).
117
CAL, supra note 46, art. 43.
118
Id. arts. 46, 68.
119
Wang Interview, supra note 55.
114
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The lack of any authority over nonparties may derive from Chinese
legal philosophy and history. As previously stated, the Chinese legal system
was historically an authoritarian imperial system that tended to be harsh on
all participants, including witnesses. 120 Sometimes, witnesses themselves
were imprisoned or punished.121 Thus, a culture emerged that stressed the
maintenance of good relationships with others in the community.122 Chinese
arbitration proceedings reflect this culture today; Chinese parties tend to
rarely rely on witness testimony, and when they do it is usually obtained
through written statements.123 Contemporary legal philosophy characterizes
arbitration as “a closed box” containing only the two parties that had
consented to the arbitration agreement; others cannot be “pulled” into this
arbitration box. 124 Additionally, nonparties may not want to disrupt
relationships that they have with both parties involved in the dispute. 125
Chinese international arbitration stresses the contractual nature of
arbitration, believing that the act of binding a nonparty to arbitration
proceedings is an injustice and an infringement of the nonparty’s rights.126
This is why arbitrators are not permitted to compel nonparties to cooperate
in arbitration proceedings, including the disclosure of evidence.
B.

Civil Law Jurisdictions Generally Do Not Grant Arbitrators Authority
over Nonparties

As reflected in Chinese international arbitration practices, civil law
jurisdictions generally do not grant arbitrators authority over nonparties. In
Germany, although an arbitral tribunal has no authority to compel a nonparty
to attend a hearing, to give testimony, or to disclose documents, the German
Arbitration Law Section 1050 permits the parties to petition the German
civil courts to help arbitrators with evidence collection.127 In the absence of
120

Jones, supra note 6, at 11.
Id.
Id.
123
Email from Sally Harpole, International Arbitrator, to authors (Dec. 17, 2006) (on file with
Journal); Interview with Professor Tang Houzhi, Founder of CIETAC (Nov. 15, 2006) (on file with
Journal) [hereinafter Tang Interview] (stating “[w]e do not rely on third party much . . . [they] might not be
impartial”).
124
Guo Interview, supra note 54.
125
Wang Interview, supra note 55.
126
See Michael H. Bagot, Jr. & Dana A. Henderson, Not Party, Not Bound? Not Necessarily: Binding
Third Parties to Maritime Arbitration, 26 TUL. MAR. L. J. 413, 416 (2002). Although Bagot and
Henderson address the issue of binding a third party into arbitration proceedings as an actual party, they
also present arguments that can be used to protect nonparties against forced evidentiary disclosure.
127
Zivilprozeβordnung [ZPO] [Civil Procedure Statute] Sept. 12, 1950, § 1050 (stating “[t]he arbitral
tribunal or a party with the approval of the arbitral tribunal may request court assistance in taking evidence
or performance of other judicial acts which the arbitral tribunal is not empowered to carry out. Unless it
121
122
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an asserted legal privilege, the German Civil Code of Procedure
(Zivilprozeβordnung) (“ZPO”) allows the courts to compel a witness to
appear and testify. 128 The courts may also order a nonparty to disclose
documents.129 However, Article 142 of the ZPO affords nonparties some
protection; it provides that “[t]hird parties are under no obligation to produce
the documents if the production cannot reasonably be required from them or
if the information is privileged.”130
In comparison, under France’s N.C.P.C. “the arbitrator cannot address
a request to [a] non-party.”131 The articles relating to arbitration in France
make almost no mention of nonparties, except to provide that they cannot be
forced to testify under oath.132 In fact, the articles relating to arbitration
expressly reject incorporation of N.C.P.C. Article 11(2), which permits a
court to order any person to produce evidence.133 Thus, nonparties cannot be
compelled to testify before the arbitral tribunal or to produce any documents.
In addition, as evidenced by a lack of language granting permission in the
N.C.P.C., the tribunal cannot petition French courts to help collect
evidence.134
Both Germany and France exemplify how civil law traditions are
crippling to the ability of courts and tribunals to exercise authority over nonconsenting third parties. Generally, if a nonparty does not want to cooperate,
the court will not compel his or her compliance.
C.

Evidence Disclosure Procedures Vary for Nonparties in Common Law
Jurisdictions

Common law jurisdictions sharply contrast with their civil law
counterparts in regard to nonparty evidence disclosure. Common law
regards the application as inadmissible, the court shall execute the request according to its rules on taking
evidence or other judicial acts. The arbitrators are entitled to participate in any judicial taking of evidence
and to ask questions.”).
128
Rützel, supra note 69. Witnesses can refuse to testify if they are close relatives to a party, are
subject to professional secrecy, would incriminate themselves, would face direct financial loss, or would
disclose business secrets. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW OF THE
NATIONAL REPORT FOR GERMANY at 2, available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/others/
actions_for_damages/executive_summaries/germany_en.pdf
[hereinafter
European
Commission’s
Executive Summary].
129
European Commission’s Executive Summary, supra note 128.
130
Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 19, at 1326 n.59.
131
Perloff, supra note 21, at 349.
132
See N.C.P.C. arts. 1442-507. Article 1461 states that third parties do not need to testify under oath.
This probably only relates to cooperative third parties who choose to testify before the arbitral tribunal.
The article does not grant the arbitral tribunal the authority to compel uncooperative third parties.
133
Perloff, supra note 21, at n.150.
134
See N.C.P.C. arts. 1442-507.
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countries generally permit arbitrators to compel nonparties to disclose. In
England, Article 38(5) of the English Arbitration Act permits the arbitral
tribunal to direct any witness to be examined under oath.135 If a nonparty
refuses to recognize the powers granted to arbitrators under Article 38, then
the party seeking testimony or documents can petition the English courts136
to compel disclosure under Article 43 of the Act.137 A party may issue a
subpoena to a third party with permission from the arbitral tribunal. 138
However, the range of discovery under Article 43 of the English Arbitration
Act is narrow.139 Requests cannot be based on mere suspicion.140 Parties
can only request documents when they have knowledge of the documents’
existence and can show that they are relevant to the arbitral proceedings.141
In Singapore, the evidentiary rules for nonparty discovery in
international arbitration are even more liberal than the English rules.
Whereas in England the arbitral tribunal has sole authority to subpoena a
nonparty for testimony or document production, Singapore allows any party
to the arbitration agreement to issue a subpoena.142 This discovery power is
restricted in two ways: the witness must be available in Singapore and the
nonparty cannot be made to produce documents if those documents could
not legally be compelled for production in a trial.143
In the United States, under Section 7 of the FAA, arbitral tribunals
“may summon in writing any person to attend before them or any of them as
a witness and in a proper case to bring with him or them any book, record,
document, or paper which may be deemed material as evidence in the
case.” 144 American courts have uniformly interpreted “any person” to
include nonparties. 145 Witnesses and nonparties, who have never entered
into an arbitration agreement, are legally bound to appear before American
arbitrators to provide whatever evidence they may possess that is of interest
135

Arbitration Act, 1996, 38(5) (Eng.).
David Fraser, Arbitration of International Commercial Disputes Under English Law, 8 AM. REV.
INT’L ARB. 1, 12 (1997).
137
Arbitration Act, 1996, 43(1) (Eng.). It is important to note that there are limitations to the use of
Article 43. A party cannot petition the courts without the permission of the Tribunal or the opposing party.
In addition, the nonparty must be located within the United Kingdom and the arbitration proceedings must
be in England, Wales, or Northern Ireland.
138
Nathan D. O’Malley & Shawn C. Conway, Document Discovery in International Arbitration –
Getting the Documents You Need, 18 TRANSNAT’L LAW 371, 377 (2005).
139
Id.
140
Id. at 378.
141
Id.
142
Singapore Arbitration Act, Art. 30(1) (2001).
143
Id. arts. 30(2), (4).
144
9 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
145
Simpson & Kesikli, supra note 32; Stolt-Nielson SA. v. Celanese AG, 430 F.3d 567, 570 (2d Cir.
2005).
136
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to the tribunal. A federal court may find a person in contempt for failing to
obey the summons or subpoena from the arbitral panel. The court may
impose the same penalties that are available against an uncooperative
witness in federal court.146
Unlike the broad powers arbitrators have over nonparties during
arbitration hearings, their authority over nonparties during pre-hearing stages
is limited. Though generally permissive, common law jurisdictions are split
over the degree of power granted to arbitrators over nonparties during prehearing stages. For example, in the United States, district circuits have
diverging views on whether arbitral tribunals have the authority to issue
subpoenas for testimony and documents from nonparties during the prehearing stages.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals issued the most liberal
interpretation of an arbitrator’s powers under Section 7 of the FAA in
American Federation of Television and Radio Artists v. WJBK-TV. 147
Looking to the FAA for guidance on labor arbitration, the court held that
Section 7 granted arbitrators the power to compel nonparties to produce
documents for parties to inspect during the pre-hearing stage.148 Although
the court refrained from determining whether Section 7 permits arbitral
tribunals to subpoena nonparties to pre-hearing depositions, its decision
imposed no restrictions on compelling nonparties to produce documents.149
As long as the arbitrator deems the information relevant to the case, a
subpoena for nonparty disclosure of documents must be enforced by the
courts.150
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals came out on the other end of the
spectrum. In Hay Group, Inc. v. EBS Acquisition Corp.,151 the court held
that pre-hearing discovery on nonparties is prohibited in arbitration.152 The
nonparty appellants sought to avoid compliance with a lower court order
forcing them to disclose documents during the pre-hearing stage.153 Using a
strict textual interpretation, the court held that Section 7 of the FAA only
146

9 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
164 F.3d 1004 (6th Cir. 1999).
148
Id. at 1009.
149
Id. at n.7 (stating, “[w]e do not reach the question of whether an arbitrator may subpoena a third
party for a discovery deposition relating to a pending arbitration proceeding.”).
150
Id. at 1010. The court held that the relevance of the information sought and the appropriateness
for the issuance of a subpoena should be determined at the first instance by the arbitral panel, not the
courts. The court, in dicta, then went on to explain that the court must give deference to the arbitral panel
and assume that the arbitrators are experienced enough to screen for relevant information and to impose
proper safeguards on sensitive materials.
151
360 F.3d 404 (3d Cir. 2004).
152
Id. at 411.
153
Id. at 405.
147
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grants arbitrators the ability to subpoena nonparties to depositions and the
disclosure of documents at the actual hearing, but not before it.154 The court
specifically rejected any “special needs circumstance” for which a nonparty
must disclose documents prior to an arbitral hearing.155
Two other circuits have taken a more moderate stance on FAA Section
7. Like the Sixth Circuit, the Eighth Circuit upheld an arbitrator’s implicit
right to subpoena documents from a nonparty during the pre-hearing stage in
In the Matter of Arbitration Between Security Life Insurance Company of
America and Duncanson & Holt, Inc. 156 However, in dicta, the court
determined that the nonparty seeking to avoid the subpoena in this case was
“not a mere bystander pulled into this matter arbitrarily,” but a “party to the
contract that [was at] the root of the dispute.” Therefore, the nonparty in this
case was “integrally related to the underlying arbitration.” 157 Taking the
court’s reasoning as a whole, a nonparty must be “integrally” related to the
arbitration for the arbitrators to subpoena pre-hearing document
production.158
In Comsat Corporation v. National Science Foundation,159 the Fourth
Circuit held that Section 7 did not grant an arbitrator the power to subpoena
a nonparty for a pre-hearing deposition or document production “absent a
showing of special need or hardship.”160 The court created this “special”
circumstance exception because it believed that in complex cases, the
efficiency of arbitration would be degraded, rather than enhanced, by
limiting discovery. 161 It held that the plaintiff seeking to enforce the
subpoena failed to show a special need or hardship because the plaintiff
could obtain much of the desired information through the Freedom of
Information Act.162 Yet, the court expressly rejected an attempt to define
154
Id. at 407. The court used a two-part test in determining that Section 7 did not grant arbitrators the
power to subpoena the disclosure of documents from nonparties during the pre-hearing stage. First, it
looked at the clear language of the statute, which it interpreted as clearly prohibiting pre-hearing nonparty
disclosure, similar to Rule 45 of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedures prior to its amendment in 1991. Prior
to 1991, Rule 45 did not allow federal courts to issue pre-hearing document subpoenas on nonparties. The
court then examined if following the literal, textual language of the statute would lead to an “absurd” result.
It held it did not because forcing arbitral tribunals to only subpoena nonparties for actual hearings would
restrict the ability of parties to force nonparties into arbitration when they never consented to an arbitration
agreement.
155
Id. at 411.
156
228 F.3d 865, 870-71 (8th Cir. 2000).
157
Id. at 871.
158
It is unclear whether the Eighth Circuit mirrors the Sixth Circuit in its Section 7 interpretation or if
it requires the nonparty to be “integrally related.” Simpson & Kesikli, supra note 32, at 283.
159
190 F.3d 269 (4th Cir. 1999).
160
Id. at 271.
161
Id. at 276.
162
Id.
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“special need” except to say that “at a minimum, a party must demonstrate
that the information it seeks is otherwise unavailable.”163
England and Singapore demonstrate how common law jurisdictions
generally allow arbitrators to exercise authority over nonparties. However,
even in common law jurisdictions, different evidentiary rules diverge in the
extent to which they empower arbitrators to compel evidence disclosure by
nonparties during the pre-arbitration stage. Most common law jurisdictions
agree that arbitrators’ powers to compel nonparty evidence disclosure ensure
fair and equitable outcomes.
D.

The Institutional Status of CIETAC May Influence Nonparties to
Cooperate and to Disclose Evidence in Their Possession

Even in jurisdictions that do not grant arbitrators authority over
nonparties, many arbitrators still ask nonparties to disclose evidence,
recognizing that they have no power to enforce their request.164 In some
situations, the nonparty complies. In others, the party refuses to comply and
the arbitrators must proceed with the arbitration hearing without the
evidence.165 In China, arbitrations generally fall under the latter category.
Although the arbitral tribunal cannot compel a nonparty to produce
evidence, it can use CIETAC’s institutional power to persuade the nonparty
to cooperate with the arbitration proceedings. This is especially effective
when the nonparty is a state entity, because Chinese culture places more
emphasis on institutions than individuals.166 Thus, in situations where an
individual party might not be able to get a nonparty to cooperate, an
institution such as CIETAC might be able to persuade a party to disclose.
A recent construction case provides an example of how CIETAC’s
institutional leverage may influence nonparties to cooperate in the dispute
resolution process and disclose valuable evidence they may have.167 A local
administrative bureau (a nonparty) possessed a document that a foreign party
needed but could not obtain directly.168 The tribunal permitted CIETAC’s
Secretariat to issue a notice to the bureau, asking for assistance in producing
the document. 169 The local bureau complied and made it available to
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CIETAC. 170 This institutional leverage is potentially more common in
Chinese international arbitration than other jurisdictions.171
Another recent CIETAC construction case provides further example
of institutional influence over nonparties in the arbitration process. In that
case, a labor company accused a construction corporation of failing to pay
for services rendered. 172 The labor company offered several documents
signed by the construction corporation’s employee to prove that the labor
company had properly rendered its services. The construction corporation
claimed that the employee who signed the documents was not authorized to
do so and that there was no evidence that the signer was even an employee
of the respondent.173 The arbitral tribunal utilized CIETAC and investigated
the matter by reviewing the city’s construction archive. 174 The tribunal
found numerous instances where the same worker had signed on behalf of
the respondent, showing that the employee was indeed authorized to sign the
document in question.175 After this evidence was collected the respondent
quickly settled with the claimant.176
Thus, Chinese international arbitrators generally must allow
nonparties to determine for themselves whether to cooperate with the
arbitration process. They will attempt to influence nonparties to participate,
using institutional leverage when possible. However, they are severely
restricted by a lack of express power granted to them by either institutional
rules or arbitration law to compel nonparties to cooperate.
V.

PRE-HEARING EVIDENCE DISCLOSURE CONTRIBUTES
AND EFFICIENT RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES

TO THE

TIMELY

Like rules in common law jurisdictions, CIETAC 2005 Rules permit
pre-hearing evidence disclosure. Institutions primarily set such rules
because national arbitration laws rarely address the pre-hearing stage.
During a preliminary hearing, arbitrators may settle numerous procedural
issues such as the daily and weekly schedule, the extent and manner of
witness examination, the privileges the tribunal will recognize, the order of
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presentations, and other issues.177 Arbitrators also regularly collect lists of
prospective witnesses. 178 Furthermore, during the pre-hearing, arbitrators
may also give the parties a list of legal questions that the tribunal determines
are important for the parties to address.179
This section examines the pre-hearing stage separately because of its
significance to the timely and efficient resolution of disputes.180 One study
suggests that when parties to litigation have a reasonable expectation of how
the court will rule, the possibility of settlement is higher.181 By extension, if
parties are able to obtain more information on the dispute prior to the actual
hearing, the chance of settlement may also be higher in international
arbitration.182 Pre-hearings are also useful procedurally for organizing the
arbitration process and narrowing the issues at dispute.
A.

The CIETAC Pre-Hearing Evidence Collection Procedures Are More
Similar to Those of Common Law Jurisdictions

Pre-hearing evidence collection is practiced and explicitly permitted
in arbitration institutions located in common law jurisdictions. In contrast,
civil law institutions are silent about pre-hearing evidence collection.
CIETAC, in this aspect, mirrors arbitration institutions in common law
jurisdictions because it expressly grants arbitrators the power to collect
evidence during the pre-hearing stage.
In common law jurisdictions, pre-hearing procedures are explicit and
appear to be uniform across international arbitration institutions. In
Singapore, for example, SIAC arbitral tribunals can require parties to submit
witness lists 183 and answer questions drafted by the arbitrators. 184 To
increase efficiency and save time during the actual arbitral hearing, SIAC
even mandates that the parties participate in two rounds of “Statement of
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Evidence” exchanges.185 The London Center for International Arbitration
similarly allows tribunals to collect lists of witnesses186 and pose pertinent
questions to the parties.187 Although it is silent about pre-hearing arbitrator
questions, the American Arbitration Association Rules expressly grant
arbitrators the authority to “conduct a preparatory conference with the
parties for the purpose of organizing, scheduling, and agreeing to procedures
to expedite the subsequent proceedings.”188 The AAA Rules also allow the
arbitrators to collect the names of witnesses before hearing the testimony.189
The ICC and the German Arbitration Institute, however, are silent
about the pre-hearing evidence collection powers of arbitrators. The ICC
requires that “Terms of Reference” be settled at the preliminary stages of
arbitration.190 The ICC states that these Terms of Reference will be drawn
up by the Arbitral Tribunal, and must include decisions on the place of
arbitration, applicable procedural rules, claims and counterclaims, and other
subjects.191 However, the purpose of the Terms of Reference is primarily
organizational, providing arbitrators and parties with a way to gain more
evidence.
Provisions of the CIETAC 2005 Rules addressing an arbitrator’s
power to collect evidence during the pre-hearing stage are similar to
institutional rules in common law jurisdictions. Article 29 explicitly permits
arbitrators to “issue procedural directions and lists of questions, hold prehearing meetings and preliminary hearings, and produce terms of reference,
etc., unless otherwise agreed by the parties.”192 To increase party autonomy,
Article 29 was amended with the phrase “unless otherwise agreed by the
parties,” essentially giving the parties the power to make changes to the
arbitration procedures, so long as both parties agree.193 The amendments
also implemented other substantial changes to CIETAC 2005 Rules.194 Prior
185
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to 2005, CIETAC’s rules were silent about pre-hearing meetings, even
though the first hearings often functioned as such.195
This departure from civil law custom is significant for Chinese
international arbitration. Pre-hearing meetings and evidence collection
increase the efficiency and speed of arbitration proceedings because they
reduce the number of disputed issues and procedurally organize the hearing.
They may also increase the likelihood of settlement.
B.

Pre-Hearing Evidence Disclosures Are Rarely Used in Chinese
International Arbitration

Despite the ability to hold pre-hearing meetings to set procedural
guidelines, exchange evidence between parties, and collect further evidence,
CIETAC arbitrators in practice do not hold preliminary meetings. Most
CIETAC arbitrators are not accustomed to holding pre-hearing meetings.196
When arbitrators do exercise the right to hold them, pre-hearing meetings
usually only occur in complicated cases where the evidence proffered by the
parties is complex and large in quantity.197 Kou Liyun, a CIETAC arbitrator,
states,
[w]hether a pre-hearing procedure may be adopted . . . depends
on the facts of each case. By virtue of the quantity and the
complexity of evidences [sic] submitted, CIETAC arbitrators
may set up a pre-hearing to make both parties clear [about
which evidence will be presented and in what manner].198
Normally, however, pre-hearing meetings are strictly procedural; they deal
with setting deadlines and agreeing on which procedural rules should govern
the arbitration. 199 Less complicated cases rarely involve solicitation of
evidence by the arbitrators or opposing party.
There are many reasons for the lack of pre-hearing meetings at
CIETAC. Arbitrators have the sole authority to determine whether to
conduct a preliminary hearing, 200 and as previously mentioned many are
unaccustomed to holding such a hearing. CIETAC domestic arbitration
195
Tang Interview, supra note 123 (stating that “[v]ery frankly, the first oral hearing in CIETAC
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196
See Guo Interview, supra note 54. See also Shi Interview, supra note 54 (stating “I do not
organize pre-hearing[s] to exchange evidence. The first hearing will serve for that purpose.”).
197
Wang Interview, supra note 55.
198
Kou Email, supra note 96.
199
Guo Interview, supra note 54.
200
Jia Interview, supra note 56.

68

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 17 NO. 1

cases cannot have pre-hearing meetings.201 The 2005 Rules expressly permit
pre-hearings for international arbitrations, but this change is recent and time
may be needed for awareness to expand. Furthermore, the way arbitrators
are compensated may play a role in the success of these proceedings.
Because CIETAC arbitrators are remunerated in a single fee rather than paid
by the hour, arbitrators may be less inclined to spend additional time and
resources on pre-hearing matters as they will not receive extra compensation
for that pre-hearing work.202 However, the payment scheme should not be a
significant factor because pre-hearing meetings often help to narrow the
focus of the arbitration and therefore decrease the time spent in an actual
hearing, sometimes by an entire day or two.203
Though not often used in practice, it is still important to note that prehearing evidence collection is possible under CIETAC Rules. CIETAC
Secretariats believe preliminary meetings increase the efficiency and speed
of arbitration. 204
Likewise, CIETAC arbitrators, especially those
experienced in international arbitration, view pre-hearing meetings as
beneficial to the arbitral process.205 Therefore, with the recent change in
Rules, the use of pre-hearing meetings will likely increase dramatically in
the near future. Parties involved with arbitrations should not only be
proactive in petitioning arbitrators to hold pre-hearing meetings to exchange
evidence, but should also lobby arbitrators to use their powers to collect
evidence prior to the hearing, including issuing lists of questions to the
opposing party.
VI.

PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES: PLANNING AHEAD

Although this Article has illustrated that alternative courses can be
taken when parties face the limitations on evidence disclosure in Chinese
international arbitration, the most efficient and effective way to disclose
evidence may be to contractually agree to it beforehand.206 An evidence
disclosure clause can either be placed into an arbitration agreement or agreed
upon in a pre-hearing conference. 207 Either form can determine the
201
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procedural rules, the amount and types of documents that can be disclosed,
and the time limits spent on evidence collection.208
CIETAC 2005 Rules make the inclusion of a disclosure clause
relatively easy because the rules stress party autonomy. The new regulations
allow the arbitral tribunal wide discretion to determine procedural rules such
as choosing an inquisitorial or adversarial nature, setting pre-hearing
meetings, and deciding terms of reference. 209 However, each of these
arbitral powers is prefaced with “unless otherwise agreed by the parties,”
which essentially gives parties the ability to conduct the arbitration as they
wish.210 In fact, the parties can agree to use other institutional rules rather
than CIETAC Rules.211 For example, parties can agree to use a common law
institutional rule if they prefer more liberal evidence disclosure rules.
One set of rules that parties can contractually agree to use is the
International Bar Association’s Rules on the Taking of Evidence in
International Arbitration (“IBA Rules”). The IBA Rules were meant to
provide “mechanisms for the presentation of documents, witnesses of fact,
expert witnesses and inspections, as well as for the conduct of evidentiary
hearings.”212 Shortly after their adoption and publication in 1999, the IBA
Rules or similar rules were implemented in practically all major
international arbitrations. 213 The popularity of the IBA Rules can be
attributed to the fact that they bridge the procedural gap between common
law and civil law jurisdictions.214 Though the IBA Rules generally grant
disclosure powers to arbitrators, these powers are tightly restricted,
reassuring parties and lawyers who are accustomed to civil law practices.215
The IBA Rules provision for compelling nonparty disclosure provides
an example of a compromise between different legal practices. In Article 3,
relating to documents, the IBA Rules state that “if a party wishes to obtain
the production of documents from a person or organization who is not a
Party to the arbitration and from whom the Party cannot obtain the
documents on its own, the Party may . . . ask [the Tribunal] to take whatever
208
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steps are legally available to obtain the requested documents.”216 However,
the request must be limited to those documents that the party knows exist.217
A party must be able to “identify the documents in sufficient detail and state
why such documents are relevant and material to the outcome of the
case.”218 Article 4 of the IBA Rules states that the Arbitral Tribunal may
take whatever legally permissible steps it sees fit in order to obtain the
testimony of a nonparty that is unwilling to voluntarily present evidence.219
The party seeking to force the testimony of an uncooperative nonparty must
identify the witness, describe the subjects of the testimony sought and state
why testimony is relevant.220 These restrictions ensure that discovery does
not become a “fishing expedition,” which can, and often does, occur in
common law jurisdictions. Similar defenses and restrictions exist for parties
who seek to protect themselves from the more invasive common law
jurisdiction disclosure procedures.221
However, even where parties agree beforehand that they will use an
institutional rule that permits forced disclosure, arbitrators may still be tied
by the Chinese Arbitration Law. By agreeing to expand CIETAC 2005
Rules or substitute those rules with another institution’s rules, the parties can
bypass the limitations and weaknesses of CIETAC’s evidence disclosure
rules. However, true sanctioning power will still be absent due to the
wording of CAL. 222 Article 4(2) of CIETAC 2005 Rules states that the
“parties’ agreement shall prevail except where such agreement is inoperative
or in conflict with a mandatory provision of the law of the place of
arbitration.” 223 As previously mentioned, CAL provides no guidance in
regard to compelling parties and nonparties of evidence disclosure.
Therefore, even if the parties’ agreement is not “in conflict” with the
mandatory provisions of CAL, the arbitral tribunal is not able to rely on
CAL to seek court assistance, except when preserving evidence or property.
Whereas under the FAA parties and nonparties can be compelled to attend or
held in contempt of court,224 there is no punishment under CAL for parties
and nonparties who do not cooperate with the arbitral tribunal’s orders. The
216
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Chinese Arbitration Law must, thus, be amended to provide arbitrators with
the ability to seek Chinese court assistance in collecting evidence.
VII. CONCLUSION
Chinese international arbitration law limits the arbitrator’s authority to
compel the disclosure of evidence. Arbitrators are not able to compel parties
to disclose evidence, nor can they ask nonparties to produce documents or to
testify. However, CIETAC arbitrators may collect evidence during the prehearing stage. Unfortunately, this practice is rarely used. Despite these
setbacks, there are alternative steps that parties and arbitrators can take.
Parties may petition the Chinese courts to require the preservation of
evidence, which thus places the desired evidence under court supervision for
the arbitrators to freely inspect. Similarly, arbitrators can exercise their right
to draw an adverse inference from an uncooperative or unresponsive party
and render an award against that party. Arbitrators may also use CIETAC’s
institutional name and influence to persuade nonparties to cooperate with the
arbitration process.
Although these options may potentially be used to obtain desired
evidence, it is a far more efficient and prudent option for parties to agree
beforehand on the extent of the arbitrator’s evidence disclosure powers. The
new CIETAC 2005 Rules promote this method by emphasizing party
autonomy and allowing parties to adopt a different set of evidentiary rules.
The trend in China regarding international arbitration is moving toward an
increase in party autonomy and a more balanced approach to evidence
disclosure procedures. Chinese lawmakers have incorporated aspects of
both civil and common law arbitration procedures in an attempt to strike a
balance. The rules neither permit broad, resource- and time-consuming
evidence disclosure, nor deny all requests for compelling disclosure of
evidence necessary for a just arbitral award.

